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This paper analyzes empirically the impact of fiscal policy on the price level for the cases of 
Euro area. We investigate whether the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) is able to deliver a 
reasonable explanation for the different performances of the price level in the different country 
of Euro area. Also, this paper examines the causal relationship between output gap, public debt, 
budget deficit, interest rate and inflation rate, and the impact of monetary policy on public debt 
management, in Euro Area from 1999Q1 to 2013Q4. The evidence does not let hear strong 
political coordination in Euro Area, and supports the idea that the monetary policy is more 
stabilizing in its influence on the economic activity than the budget policy. This paper deals with 
the problems of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies in Euro area. The particular 
stance of monetary policy affects the capacity of the government to finance the budget deficit by 
changing the cost of debt service and limiting or expanding the available sources of financing. 
Lack of coordination between the monetary and fiscal authorities will result in inferior overall 
economic performance. A weak policy stance in one policy area burdens the other area and is 
unsustainable in the long term. 
 
Keywords: Monetary policy, Fiscal policy, Euro Area, FTPL, Public debt, budget deficit 
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INTRODUCTION 
The efficient pursuit of the objectives of the authorities overall macroeconomic policy framework 
requires a close degree of coordination of financial policies. In this paper, the interaction 
between monetary and fiscal policies is analyzed, stressing the need for policy coordination at 
two different levels: fulfillment of the overall policy objectives (including financial sector 
development), and institutional and operational procedures. On the former, the main interactions 
between monetary and fiscal policies relates to the financing of the budget deficit and its 
consequences for monetary management. 
The monetary policy stance will affect the capacity of the government to finance the 
budget deficit by affecting the cost of debt service and by limiting or expanding the available 
sources of financing. At the same time, the financing strategy of the government and its financial 
needs will place constraints on the operational independence of the monetary authority. 
In many countries, monetary policy has been subservient to fiscal policy; central banks 
have often been required to finance public sector deficits, including those arising from quasi-
fiscal activities. Such subordination of monetary policy to fiscal needs introduced an inflationary 
bias. In recent years, however, there has been a worldwide trend, in the context of the 
modernization of financial markets, to set up institutional and operational mechanisms that 
would ensure more efficient overall policy design and implementation. These include the 
adoption of market-based monetary and debt management instruments, as well as moves to 
increase central bank independence and in some cases the design of strict rule-based monetary 
arrangements, such as currency boards. 
Two fundamental issues need to be stressed regarding the nature of monetary and fiscal 
policy coordination. First, the overall policy mix as well as each individual policy must be set on 
a sustainable course. Second, monetary and fiscal policies operate in different time frames, with 
monetary policy adjusting almost on a continuous basis and economic agents reacting with 
much shorter lags to it than in the case of changes to fiscal policy, while fiscal policy takes time 
to adjust and economic agents react with a lag to such adjustments. 
This paper examines the causal relationship between output gap, public debt, budget 
deficit, interest rate and inflation rate, and the impact of monetary policy on public debt 
management, in Euro Area from 1999Q1 to 2013Q4. The evidence does not let hear strong 
political coordination in Euro Area, and supports the idea that the monetary policy is more 
stabilizing in its influence on the economic activity than the budget policy. This paper deals with 
the problems of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies in Euro area. The particular 
stance of monetary policy affects the capacity of the government to finance the budget deficit by 
changing the cost of debt service and limiting or expanding the available sources of financing. 
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Lack of coordination between the monetary and fiscal authorities will result in inferior overall 
economic performance. A weak policy stance in one policy area burdens the other area and is 
unsustainable in the long term. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out in general Euro Area crisis. 
Section 3 reviews Methodology and data. Section 4 analyzes Methodology and data. Section 5 
presents empirical result and some concluding remarks. 
 
THE EURO AREA CRISIS 
Debt crisis in the euro area indicates a succession of financial events which affect, since the 
beginning of 2010, the savings in 17 Member States of the European Union, whose currency is 
the euro, in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2010. First event is raised in 2010, with the 
Greek debt crisis as well as its important and constant deficit. It extends to autumn 2010 with 
public debt crisis of Ireland, caused by the rescue of national banks, made it necessary by 
previous excessive private debt. During summer 2011 a stock exchange storm occurs caused 
by the crisis of the Greek debt. 
For the first time since 2007 and the whole of public accounts of the euro area debt 
drops in 2013, announcing a way out of crisis. At the end of the first quarter of 2013, the euro 
area debt-to-GDP ratio was established to 92.2% in Euro Area (EA17), against 90.6% at the 
end of the fourth quarter of 2012. In the UE27, the ratio increased passing from 85.2% to 
85.9%. Compared to the first quarter of 2012, the debt-to-GDP ratio has increased in both the 
Euro Area (from 88.2% to 92.2%) than in the EU27 (83.3% to 85.9%). The highest ratios of 
public debt were recorded in Greece (160.5\%), Italy (130.3% ), in Portugal (127.2%) and in the 
Ireland (125.1%), and lowest  in Estonia (10.0%), Bulgaria (18.0%) and in Luxembourg (22.4%). 
 
Figure1:  Public debt to GDP ratio in Euro Area 
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The crisis of public debt is a symptom  which must result in searching the main causes which 
are multiple from one country to another: a very strong government debt related to important 
structural problems (difficulty in raising the tax and controlling the expenditure), a housing boom 
in Spain which led private agents to contract risky amounts of private debt, the absence of 
appreciation by the banks of the risks incurred as well in the granting of the loans as in their 
refinancing, too modest efforts (since the subprime crisis) for regulating the banking and 
financial sector, the weakness of the growth which touches the whole of the old industrialized 
countries since the economic crisis known as of the Great Recession (2008 and afterwards), the 
cumulative effect caused by expectations of a continued slowdown in growth prospects. 
 
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
Monetary policy analyses remained strongly in favor since the Second World War, analysis of 
fiscal policy has lost favor with the optimization Keynesian countercyclical policies in the 1970s 
to the extent that much of monetary indifferent literature considered to the achievement of price 
stability (Walsh, 2003). 
Taylor (2000) gives an overview of increased interest in the development of policies in 
macroeconomic models during the past twenty years, describing that by «the new normative 
macroeconomics». This new approach focuses on the evaluation of the various political rules 
in the context of a particular, micro-founded, the model of the economy. 
Leeper (1991) developed the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), he introduced two 
essential points: the distinction between active and passive political policy, highlighting two 
stable organizations of economic policies (active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy 
passive or vice versa). 
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) defined an active monetary-policy regime which satisfies 
the Taylor principle. They concluded that monetary and fiscal policies should be either active or 
passive for stability. 
Dixit and Lambertini (2000) consider the interactions between policies in a configuration 
where the monetary authority controls the inflation. The source of conflict is that the fiscal 
authority aims to increase output and inflation than the monetary authority. The non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium has both a higher inflation and a decline in production. commitment by the 
monetary authority is not appropriate or sufficient if fiscal policy is active, but the budget 
commitment hearing would result in a better outcome. 
Kirsanova.al (2005) extend the three equations of monetary model to a five equations 
model of monetary and fiscal policies by adding the government's inter-temporal budget 
constraint. They suppose that there are a lag period of implementation of fiscal policy that 
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reflects the legislative and political processes required for important modifications in 
discretionary fiscal policy, and shift a one period of effect of the monetary policy, which reflects 
the transmission system. Kuttner (2002) doubts if the budget policy, taking into account these 
delays, could arrive to an interaction with the monetary policy and a period of effect of the shift 
monetary policy, which reflects the transmission mechanism. Kuttner doubted whether fiscal 
policy, given these delays could achieve interaction with monetary policy. 
Melitz (1995) analyzes the effect of monetary and fiscal policy on public debt and deficits 
in 19 OECD countries 1960/78 to 1995 by using the pooled data. He made several interesting 
results: First, fiscal policy reacts to report of the public debt in a manner of stabilization. Second, 
the laxist fiscal policy leads to a restrictive monetary policy and vice versa. Third, the automatic 
stabilization of fiscal policy is much lower than generally perceived. 
Melitz (1997) examines the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in a pooled 
regression annual data on 19 OECD countries. He notes initially that the monetary and fiscal 
policies settle in opposed directions, as substitutes, then, that the budget policy plays a 
stabilizing role of low debt « the taxes behave in a preoccupation with a stabilization, but move 
the expenditure in a destabilizing way ». 
Favero and Monacelli (2003) studies the interactions of policies by using Markov-
Switching Vector Autoregressive Models (Krolzig, 1997), they stipulated that although fiscal 
policy shall be subject to a given regime change in an endogenous way and the regime changes 
monetarist are imposed in an exogenic way. They note than in the U.S., only between 1987 and 
2001 can be described as passive fiscal regime. Thus, Woodford (1998) affirms that since 1980 
the passivity would be a good description, and Gali and Perotti (2003) found that fiscal policy 
more and more passive during this period, after having discussed significant contributions to 
monetary and fiscal policies and their interactions. 
Muscatelli et al. (2004) estimate a New Keynesian model with the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) in a system with multiple equations. They allow fiscal policy to have two 
instruments, taxation and expenditure and motivate policy interactions by first the cyclical nature 
of each policy, and secondly, by the direction of movement of the shocks of production. They 
find that monetary policy attenuates satisfies the Taylor principle and reacts to produce a 
stabilizing manner. Thus, they conclude that the interaction depends on the shock. Shocks to 
the production of fiscal and monetary policy they act as complements whereas inflation shocks, 
they act as substitutes. 
Hughes and Hallett (2005) use individual regressions by instrumental variables to study 
the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies in the United Kingdom and the euro area. 
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He notes that monetary and fiscal policies acting as substitutes in the UK, but complement each 
other in the euro area. 
Kirsanova et al. (2006) study the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy when it 
stabilize a single economy against shocks in a dynamic environment. They suppose that fiscal 
and monetary policies stabilize the economy by causing changes in aggregate demand. Thus, 
they find that if policy makers are both volunteers, then the best result is obtained when the tax 
authority can perform monetary policy. 
Reade and J.Sthe (2008) applied the cointegrated VAR method to study the interaction 
of monetary and fiscal policy and its effect on the sustainability of developments in public debt in 
the United States in 1960-2005. They conclude that fiscal policy has ensured the sustainability 
of long-term debt by responding to the increase in debt in a way that the stabilization of the 
reaction was moderate.  However, according to their results, discretionary fiscal policy did not 
ensure a countercyclical behavior. In addition, monetary policy has followed a Taylor rule type 
and corrected the imbalance both in the short and long term. 
Reade and J.Sthe (2010) using multivariate cointegration methods to study the 
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies by examining the example of the United 
States since the early 1980s. They find that the elaboration of the monetary policy is strongly 
prospective and passive in the sense that it meets the policy rules.  In contrast, fiscal policy is 
found to be active in the sense that it does not respond to rules of fiscal policy. Thus, 
interactions between the two spheres of politics seem limited so that no policy instrument enters 
the political rule of the other sphere. But monetary policy is heavily passive is in response to 
movements of the tax policy. Furthermore, they found that the two policies are complementary, 
since both policies respond in the same way to revitalize the economy in a downturn and to 
brake during Boom. 
Fragetta and kersanova (2010) studying monetary and fiscal policy interactions in three 
countries, the United Kingdom, the United States and Sweden. They use a structural general 
equilibrium model of an open economy and the estimate using Bayesian methods. They 
assume that the authorities can act in a strategic way in a non-cooperative policy game and 
compare different leadership regimes. Thus, they characterize monetary and fiscal interactions 
in the three countries as follows: in each country, monetary authorities and fiscal authorities use 
their instruments with a substantial smoothing, and there is no evidence debt stabilization in 
'any country and finally, the feedback is low to maintain stable economy, but no evidence on the 
goal of stabilizing the debt was obtained. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The present study is carried out using quarterly time series of Euro Area 1999Q1-2013Q4. The 
data used include 𝑦𝑡  is the output gap, 𝜋𝑡  is the inflation rate, 𝑟𝑡  is the nominal interest rate, 𝑑𝑡  is 
the public debt and 𝑝𝑏𝑡 is the primary government balance defined as government receipts 
minus spending. The latter two fiscal variables are represented as fractions of GDP. For 
inflation, we calculate this from the consumer price index (CPI) measure as the most 
appropriate measure. 
Turning to economic activity, it may seem sensible to consider the information provided 
in a wide range of different measures when considering economic activity, as policymakers 
surely consider various measures when deciding upon the level of economic activity. Although 
this might suggest taking the principle component of a number of measures of economic 
activity, previous Taylor rule studies have generally taken the output gap or some measure of 
firms’ real marginal costs to be the indicator of economic activity. We use the FMI output gap 
measure. 
Following the literature, the interest rate rt is the instrument of monetary policy, while pbt 
is defined here as the instrument of fiscal policy. There is disagreement whether the fiscal 
instrument should be taxes or spending or the balance. Kirsanova et al. (2005) take government 
spending to be the tool, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) consider taxation and a number of 
others take both (for example Muscatelli and Tirelli (2004); Gali and Perotti (2003). 
Considering fiscal variables, there is disagreement over whether taxes, government 
spending or the primary balance ought to be used as the fiscal tool. Primary balance data is 
defined as: 
 
𝑃𝐵𝑡 =  𝑇𝑡 −  𝐺𝑡                                                          (1) 
 
To isolate automatic stabilisers from discretionary policy, we also consider the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance measure from the FMI. Hendry (1980) notes that measures of the 
public debt are readily available and accord to the theoretical variable for gross debt, which can 
deviate dramatically from net debt. 
Debt sustainability is an issue of importance for fiscal policy; a fiscal-policy stance is 
sustainable if it satisfies the government's intertemporal budget constraint. 
We model fiscal policy in a more general setting which allows for data non-stationarity 
and endogeneity, and we also model fiscal policy in the context of monetary policy, not least to 
consider the interactions of the two policy spheres. Questions such as the role of monetary 
policy in debt-sustainability can be investigated in this manner. 
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Section 4 has emphasised the non-stationarity, of the data series under consideration here. 
Granger and Newbold (1974) suggested that regression output may be spurious if several of the 
series modelled are non-stationary. The data series from section 4 can be combined to form a 
vector autoregression: 
 
   𝑋𝑡  =    +  𝑡 +      𝑋𝑡−𝑖       𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 +  𝑢𝑡  1 ,   𝑢𝑡  ~0  𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)                               (2) 
 
Here, 𝑋𝑡  is a 𝑝 × 𝑇 data matrix, while  0 is a 𝑝 × 𝑝 coefficient matrix, where 𝑝 = 6 is the 
number of variables in the system, and 𝑇 the number of observations. If the data are non-
stationary, so 𝑋𝑡  ~  𝐼(1),  it must be rearranged into equilibrium-correction form: 
 
    ∆𝑋𝑡 =  Π
∗ Χ𝑡−1
∗ +   Γi ΔXt−i + ut  ,
k−1
i=1                                             (3) 
 
Where   𝑋𝑡−1
∗ = (𝑋𝑡−1,1),   Π
∗ = (Π, Π0), Π =  Π𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 −  𝐼  and Γ𝑖 =  − Π𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=𝑖+1 . The 
coefficients for the lagged regressors and the constant term have been banded together, for 
ease of exposition.  Further, if 𝑋𝑡  ~  𝐼 1 ,   then given that 𝑢𝑡  ~  𝐼(0) and Δ𝑋𝑡  ~  𝐼(0) then Π must 
be of reduced rank for equation (3) to be balanced.  If Π is of reduced rank then there exist 𝑝 × 𝑟 
matrices 𝛼 and 𝛽 such that αβ′  and equation (3) becomes: 
 
                  ∆𝑋𝑡 =  αβ′ Χ𝑡−1
∗ +  Γi ΔXt−k + ut  ,
k−1
i=1                                           (4) 
 
Where   𝛽 = (𝛽, 𝛽0)’ and    Χ𝑡−1
∗ =  (𝑋𝑡−1,1).  The β′ Χ𝑡−1
∗  terms are cointegrating vectors, 
the stationary relationships between non-stationary variables, or steady-state relationships. 
Importantly, Ε (β′Χ𝑡)  since these cointegrating vectors describe steady state relationships which 
must be mean zero. 
In order to test the direction of causality between different variables, a three-stage 
procedure is followed. First, we search for the order of integration of the different time series 
using unit root tests. Generally, a variable is said to be integrated of order  (d),  written by I(d), if 
it turns out to be stationary (integrated of order (0), I(0) after differencing d times. Stationarity of 
a series is an important phenomenon because it can influence its behavior. 
 In this paper, we conduct unit root tests using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller(ADF) 
Dickey and Fuller (1979), Phillips-Perron (PP) Phillips-Perron (1988) tests and Kwiatkowski, 
Phillips, Shmidt and Shin (1992) (KPSS) tests. We use three tests in order to check the 
robustness of the results. One advantage of the PP test over the ADF test is that the former is 
robust to general forms of heterodasticity in the error term. Akaike information criterion (AIC) is 
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used to select the lag length in ADF test, while Newey-West Bartlett kernel is used to select the 
bandwidth for the PP test. 
We study in this paper the stationarity of variables. We use three types of tests. Initially, 
we apply the Dickey-Fuler Augmented (ADF), then the test of Philips and Perron (PP), which 
takes into account heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. These two tests are based on the null 
hypothesis that the process is non-stationary. We confirm our results by a third test of 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Shmidt and Shin (1992) (KPSS). The latter test, contrary to the two first, is 
based on the null hypothesis of stationarity of the series. Tables below present the results of 
three respective tests of unit root. These tests are carried out by the Logiciel E-Views 6. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Evolution of the main variables 
In this section we present the evolution of the main economic variables during the period of our 
study 1999Q1 to 2013Q4. In order to describe the economic cycle of the Euro Zone, we use the 
description of data, such as public debt, primary balance, nominal interest rate, inflation and 
output gap. 
 
a. Government deficit 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the Government deficit in the Euro Area 
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The figure 2 represents the budget deficit during the period 1999Q1 to 2013Q4. According to 
this figure we see a decline in the budget deficit between 1999 and 2000, which explains the 
increase in government revenue over expenditure. Then, it recorded an increase from 2000 to 
2004. Also, the budget deficit starts again with advanced during period from 2004 to 2007, and 
has since gradually increased until 2010, which explains the decrease in revenue, which is 
explained by the decrease in the share of services exports total by about 4 percentage points 
from 2008 to 2009, during the recent global crisis. From 2010, there is a slow gradual decrease. 
 
b. Public debt 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of public debt in the Euro area (EA 17) 
 
 
Note that in figure 3, an increase in the debt ratio between the first quarter of 1999 and the end 
of the third quarter of 2000 and from the fourth quarter of 2000 there was a mean decrease. 
Thus, from the first quarter of 2001 the public debt increases progressively and admits a steady 
pace. Thus, there is a remarkable decline in the debt ratio at the end of fourth quarter 2007 and 
a gradual change in the ratio of public debt to GDP ratio dice late in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
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Then, from 2008, there is a rapidly changing due to the financial crisis during this period. At the 
end of the first quarter of 2013, the ratio of public debt to GDP ratio stood at 92.2% in the euro 
area, against 90.6% at the end of the fourth quarter of 2012 
 
c. Output gap 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of the output gap in the Euro Area 
 
 
The « output gap » refers to the percentage difference between GDP [gross domestic product] 
and the effective [potential GDP], the latter being defined as the maximum sustainable level 
(non-inflationary) production that provides the existing stock of labor and capital in the economy, 
using current technology. Thus, from Figure 4 three step evolution can be seen in the period 
2013Q4-199Q1. So 199Q1 between 2002Q1 and show an evolution of 40% hence an increase 
in the actual GDP relative to potential GDP. Then a slow gradual evolution of 2002Q2 2008Q3 
until one notices reflecting a difference of stable production. We notice a negative trend 
between 2008Q3 and 2010Q1. Finally, a rapid and remarkable from 2010Q2 to 2013Q4 
evolution. 
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d. Interest rate 
 




The pace of nominal short-term interest rates for the Euro Zone is characterized by five periods: 
1999Q1/2001Q1, 2001Q2/2003Q1, 2003Q2/2005Q3, 2005Q4/2008Q3 and 2008Q4/2013Q4 
(Figure 5). 
During the period 1999Q1-2001Q1, the nominal interest rate increases and then 
decreases slightly, it passes from 3% to approximately 5% then it decreases to reach 
approximately 2% in 2003 Q1, and it remains stable between 2003Q2 / 2005Q3. From the 
beginning 2005Q4, it rises to a level of 5.5% at the date of 2008Q3. Rising interest rates aims to 
counteract inflationary pressures which have occurred in this period. In the following period 
2008Q4/2013Q4, the nominal interest rate decreases in a dramatic way, it passes from 5.5% to 
approximately 0.5%. In the end it decreases due to the effect of the crisis, he begins to fall and 
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e. Inflation rate 
 




From the figure we see a change in the inflation rate of the Euro Area from one year to another 
to achieve a period of stability until 2007 Q4. Then, there is a rapid evolution of inflation and 
reach 4% during 2008 Q3. From the beginning of 2008 Q4 we notice a drop in inf lation to about 
0.2% and in the end an average growth until 2013Q4. 
 
Stationary tests 
Based on the ADF, PP and KPSS  unit root tests, we find that all tested series are non-
stationary in level, that is, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. However, the 
stationarity property is reached after first differencing the series for 𝑟𝑡  and 𝑝𝑏𝑡,  and after second 
differencing for,  𝑑𝑡, and 𝑦𝑡   . Unit root testing is carried out and reported in Table 1, 2 and 3. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests are carried out using enough lags for each 
variable to ensure that no residual autocorrelation remains. 
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Table 1: Results of KPSS unit root tests 
Variables Statistics «tc »  with T + C Conclusion 
𝑑𝑡  0.220191 Non-stationary I(2) 
𝑦𝑡 0.149442 Non-stationary I(2) 
𝜋𝑡  0.055811 Non-stationary I(1) 
𝑝𝑏𝑡  0.069513 Non-stationary I(2) 
𝑟𝑡  0.101077 Non-stationary I(1) 
 
Table 2: Results of ADF unit root tests 
Variables Trend and constant Constant Conclusion 
𝑑𝑡  -1.292041 0.372062 Non-stationary I(2) 
𝑦𝑡 -2.821901 -1.797164 Non-stationary I(2) 
𝜋𝑡  -3.000098 -2.401953 Non-stationary I(1) 
𝑝𝑏𝑡  -2.909461 -2.722499 Non-stationary I(2) 
𝑟𝑡  -3.167218 -1.967961 Non-stationary I(1) 
 
 
Table 3: Results of PP unit root tests 
 
 





According to the results of these three tests, we can conclude that the following series: Public 
debt, inflation, primary balance, output gap and nominal interest rates are non-stationary. The 
non-stationary character of the series used to search for the presence of a stationary or more 
linear combinations of these variables. Indeed, the study of the series in first difference for the 
inflation rate and the nominal interest rate, and the second difference for the remaining 
variables, ensures the stationary nature of differentiated series. 
However, the three tests retain the integration of order 1 of the following series:  nominal 
interest rate and inflation rate and the integration of order 2 of public debt, primary balance and 
the output gap. This implies the existence of cointegration between the various variables. 
 
Variables Trend and constant Constant Conclusion 
𝑑𝑡  -1.054850 1.069137 Non-stationary I(2) 
𝑦𝑡 -2.712947 -2.336540 Non-stationary I(2) 
𝜋𝑡  -1.676087 -1.752210 Non-stationary I(2) 
𝑝𝑏𝑡  -2.909461 -2.722499 Non-stationary I(1) 
𝑟𝑡  -2.189057 -1.321478 Non-stationary I(1) 
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Granger, 1981 and Engle and granger, 1987 introduced the concept of integration of a variable 
in order to examine cointegration. They were placed in the case without deterministic 
component to achieve a particular concept of cointegration. To test the presence of 
cointegration of the variables in this study, the approach of Johansen, 1988 and Johansen and 
Juselius, 1990 is used. 
Indeed, the term cointegration was introduced by Granger1981. The cointegration test is 
used to check the long-term equilibrium relationship between the variables  𝑑𝑡,  𝑝𝑏𝑡 ,  𝑟𝑡 ,  𝜋𝑡 , 𝜋
𝑎
𝑡  
and  𝑦𝑡 .. The presence of an equilibrium relationship among these variables is the most used 
formally tested using statistical procedures, are those of Engle and Granger, 1987 and 
Johansen (1988). Johansen cointegration results are reported in Table 4 and 5. 
 
Table 4: Trace test results 
Series Trace statistic 
Critical value  
(0.05) 
probability conclusion 
None 55.09319 29.79707 0.0000 H0 rejected 
At most 1 16.10871 15.49471 0.0000      H0 rejected 
At most 2 0.003144 3.841466 0.9536 H0 rejected 
 
From Table 4, we see that the three variables are cointegrated, where they have a cointegrating 
relationship long term. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected because the 
trace test indicates two cointegrating equations. Moreover, the existence of cointegration 
relationship justifies the adoption of a model error correction Engle and Granger (1987). 
 
Table 5: Trace test results -2 
Series Trace statistic 
Critical value  
(0.05) 
probability conclusion 
None 17.58206 15.49471 0.0239 H0 rejected              
At most 1 2.505959 3.841466 0.1134      H0 accepted               
 
We see from Table 5 that the two variables are cointegrated, where they have a cointegrating 
relationship long term. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected because the 
trace test indicates one cointegrating equation. Moreover, the existence of cointegration 
relationship justifies the adoption of a model error correction Engle and Granger1987. 
Cointegration between series indicates causality relationships confirmed in the long 
term, but it does not give the direction of causality. Therefore, the vector error correction model 
(VECM) is used to examine causality in the short term as well as Granger causality in the long 
term. The VECM is a template that models adjustments leading to a state of long-term 
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equilibrium. This is a model which incorporates the time, the evolution of short and long term. 
Thus, the use of error correction model can highlight the common cointegrating relationship 
(common trend) and deducing the interactions between variables. 
Results suggest that there is a causal relationship from long-term public debt and budget 
deficit to the output gap (the term correction associated with the restoring force x error is 
negative (-0.266766)., and is significantly different from zero at 5\% statistical level (prob. equal 
to 0.0347) so there is catching up to the equilibrium value ie, a mechanism error correction: in 
the long term the imbalances between 3 variables are offset so the series have similar trends. 
Nevertheless, in the short term testing and test Wald we find that 'there is not a causal 
relationship from the budget deficit and public debt to output gap (Chi-square: 0.8686 pro> 0005 
therefore we accept the null hypothesis). The value of R2 = 0.61% > 0.60% and the Prob (F-
statistic) 0.000647 <0.005 shows an explanatory power of the model. 
Concerning tests of residues, we tested serial correlation we have: Prob Chi-Square (2) 
= 0.1022> 0.005) so the model does not admit a serial correlation. The model errors are 
heteroscedastic since the value of probability is less than 5 % (prob. Chi-Square 0.0313 we 
reject the null hypothesis)  and normality test presented in the following figure. 
 
Figure 7: Normality test of residuals 
 
 
From the figure we see that the prob. Jaque-Berra = 0.000003 less than 5%, or the errors of the 
model are not normally distributed. 
In contrast, the causal relationship between the interest rate and the inflation rate is as 
follows: at a disaggregated level, the results suggest that there is a causal relationship from 
long-term inflation rate of interest (the term associated with the restoring force 𝛽 error correction 
is negative (-0.007716) and is significantly different from zero at statistical threshold of 5 % 
(prob. equal to 0.0347). There so much catching up to the equilibrium value ie, an error 
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correction mechanism: in the long term the imbalances between the interest rate and the 
inflation rate are offset so the series have similar trends. 
Nevertheless, in the short term, testing the Wald test we see that there is a causal 
relationship from the inflation rate to the interest rate (Chi-square: pro 0.0097 <0.005 so we do 
not accept hypothesis null). The value of R2 =53% is less than 60% and the Prob (F-statistic) 
0.000032 = < 0.005 shows an average explanatory power of the model. 
Concerning tests of residues, we tested serial correlation (we have: Prob Chi-Square (2) 
= 0.7315 is greater than 0.005.  So the model does not admit a serial correlation. The model 
errors are heteroscedastic since the value of probability is less than 5 % (prob. Chi-Square 
0.0313 we reject the null hypothesis) and normality test presented in the following figure. 
 
Figure 7: Normality test of residuals -2 
 
 
From the figure we see that the prob. Jaque-Berra = 0.39 greater than 5%, or errors of the 
model are normally distributed. 
Indeed, Granger (1969) introduced the concept of non-causality, which aims to make the 
optimal forecast made at the variables. The causality test's objective is to evaluate the temporal 
order and the ability to forecast variables. Thus, it allows to formalize statistically economic 
relations between the variables of monetary and fiscal policies for obvious reasons of economic 
policy but also to study the variables that are likely to predict the evolution of variables monetary 
and fiscal policies and inflation. The causation analysis will highlight the interactions between 
the variables of monetary and fiscal policies. Thus, it can also have "information on the temporal 
relations between variables. 
The relationship between debt and instruments of monetary policy will be analyzed from 
the causality test (Granger1969). This test is to study the relationship between debt and the 
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different variables of fiscal policy. If the coefficients values of debt are significant, then the 
primary balance and the output gap is a "cause" of the debt. 
The one hand, a bi-directional causality between pairs of variables (debt and deficit) (the 
output gap and the budget deficit), (debt and the output gap). On the other hand, a uni-
directional causality between the couple (the output gap and the budget deficit). On the second 
hand, a bi-directional causality between pairs of variables (the interest rate and inflation rate). 
The presence of bi-directional causality denotes variables that influence each other in terms of 
forecasting ability. On the other hand, a unidirectional causality between the pair of variables 
(inflation causes interest rates Granger). 
                                             
CONCLUSIONS 
Monetary and fiscal policies appear to be two categories of economic policies that have been 
the subject of several controversies. The question of their interaction and their influence on 
economic activity and inflation are acute. Each of the two policies is likely to increase or slow 
aggregate demand. They can have very different impacts on the economy and a change in one 
can affect the other. 
Based on the approach of Johansen cointegration and Granger causality, we find that, at 
the aggregate level, there is evidence of unidirectional causality between pairs of variables (the 
budget deficit because public debt Granger) (the output gap because the budget deficit 
Granger) (the output gap because public debt Granger). It is observed that the public debt has a 
direct impact on the budget deficit, and it is observed that the budget deficit and public debt 
have a direct impact on the output gap. Also, we find a unidirectional causality between the pair 
of variables (inflation causes interest rates Granger) indeed, we note that the interest rate has a 
direct impact on the rate inflation. 
At the disaggregated level, the results suggest that there is a causal relationship to long-
term public debt from dt $and the budget deficit bt to yt as a causal relationship from long-term 
rate of inflation in interest rates. So there is a catch to the equilibrium value, an error correction 
mechanism: long-term imbalances between different variables are offset so that the series have 
similar trends. 
Nevertheless, in the short term, we see that there is no causal relationship from the 
budget deficit and public debt to output gap; however, we see that there is a causal relationship 
ranging from inflation to interest rates. 
From the results found we can conclude that the monetary and fiscal policy are not 
complementary in the Euro Area and there is a negative effect of policy coordination in the Euro 
Area, and the advantage of using methods co-integration is that each policy area will have its 
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own way to steady state, which should be ungovernable in the data, and the responses of policy 
instruments and target variables can also be set using the cointegrated VAR approach. In 
addition, our results show that there is no strong interaction between monetary policy and fiscal 
policy in the euro zone. Without efficient policy coordination, financial instability could ensure, 
leading to high interest rates, exchange rate pressures, rapid inflation, and an adverse impact 
on economic growth. 
Efficient coordination of monetary and fiscal policies will only be possible if account is 
taken of the need for policy sustainability and credibility. Both the overall policy framework as 
well as each policy area considered individually must be set on a sustainable course and be 
credible. To burden one policy area excessively as a result of a weak stance in the other policy 
area will sooner or later doom the achievement of the objectives of macroeconomic policy. 
Recent research into monetary policy has looked for interest rate rules that ensure price 
level determinacy independently of the fiscal policy of the government; this has weakened 
interest in the FTPL. Though no issue as controversial as the FTPL has emerged since, this 
recent analysis is still open to ambiguous distinctions between policy rules, that should capture 
government behavior in all possible scenarios, and equilibrium relations across the endogenous 
variables of an economic system. A more complete analysis awaits the development of new 
tools that are as simple and powerful as dynamic competitive equilibrium, and yet able to 
appropriately capture the special role of the government. The new coordination problem is : 
How do a central bank and its government come to a stable pairing of policies?  
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